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Abstract
In this paper we study the role of resale opportunities in secondary markets over
the bidding process in ﬁrst and second price auctions. This trade opportunity arises
owing to the presence of two factors. On the one hand, after receiving the object,
the winner obtains new information about the object’s value and on the other hand,
the winner may suﬀer a liquidity shock that force him to sell the object regardless
of his valuation. The buyer in the secondary market, however, does not know if the
good is being sold because the new information reveals bad news regarding the object’s
valuation, or because a liquidity shock aﬀected the seller. Our results show that revenue
equivalence still holds, and bids are usually lower than those observed in the absence of
liquidity shocks.
Keywords: Auctions; Resale Market; Adverse Selection.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D44; L1.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the eﬀect of resale opportunities in a secondary market over the
bidding process in ﬁrst and second price auctions. Unlike previous literature, we analyze a
resale market with adverse selection problems.
Over the last years there has been an increasing interest in the study of auctions with
resale. Though previous literature has modeled resale opportunities in many diﬀerent ways
it has not considered the problem of adverse selection. For example, Gupta and Lebrun
(1999), and Hafalir and Krishna (2006) consider an asymmetric environment, in which resale
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1opportunities could arise because the optimal mechanism is not eﬃcient. Garratt and Tr¨ oger
(2006) also study a model in which resale opportunities arise due to ineﬃciencies. They
analyze auctions with speculation, in which there are some ineﬃcient equilibria where the
speculator wins, even though he has no valuation for the object. In a more general setting,
Zheng (2002) identiﬁes conditions under which the outcome of the optimal auction (Myerson
(1981)) is implementable even with resale opportunities.
We consider a setting in which the resale opportunity arises because of the presence
of two factors. First, after receiving the object, only the winner obtains new information
about the object’s value. Second, the winner may suﬀer a liquidity shock that forces him
to sell regardless of his valuation. However, the buyer in the secondary market does not
know whether the ﬁrst-stage winner is selling because he received bad news, or because he
suﬀered a liquidity shock. This rises an adverse selection problem at the resale stage.
In order to analyze this problem, we consider a simple two-stage game. The game
is played by two symmetric and risk neutral buyers with interdependent valuation and
privately observed signals. The timing of the game is as follows: ﬁrst each buyer observes
his private signal and submits a bid; then, the auctioneer reveals the bids, and the object is
delivered to the agent with the highest bid. Second, after receiving some news - regarding
the value of the object - the winner may go to the resale market.
This work is closely related to Haile (2002), who analyzes a model in which resale
opportunities arise because of the arrival of new information to bidders after the auction
has been held. This new information may generate new trade opportunities. The main
diﬀerences in the setting under study are the following: i) the resale opportunity is not
necessarily an option for the second stage seller on account of the presence of a liquidity
shock; ii) in the resale market the owner of the object is better informed than the potential
buyers; therefore, there is an asymmetric information problem, even though there were not
any informational advantages before the assignment of the object; iii) the new information
is revealed to the winner as a consequence of owning the object.
We ﬁnd conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium, in which the ﬁrst-stage
auction winner voluntarily sells only if he receives bad news. Furthermore, an equilibrium
condition with monotone increasing bid functions is found only if the likelihood of receiving
bad news or having a liquidity shock is suﬃciently low. The results in this setting show
that bids are usually lower than those observed in standard models without liquidity shocks
and resale opportunities. In addition, we obtain that the revenue equivalence still holds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model, section 3 contains the
main results, and section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
22 The Model
We consider a simple two stage game played by two risk neutral buyers, indexed by i ∈
{1,2}. In the ﬁrst stage the players face an auction for an indivisible object which is assigned
to who oﬀers the highest bid. Ties are solved by randomization. In the second stage, once
the object has been assigned to the winner bid, bidders have the opportunity to bargain in
a resale market. This trade opportunity arises due to the presence of two factors. On the
one hand, after receiving the object, the winner obtains new information about the object
value. On the other hand, the winner may suﬀer a liquidity shock, with probability λ > 0,
that forces him to sell the object regardless of its valuation.
We assume symmetric bidders with interdependent valuation given by v(x1,x2,θ) =
θ + 1
2(x1 + x2), where xi ∈ [0,1] are independent privately observed signals according to
a distribution F(·) that admits a continuously diﬀerentiable density f(·). The variable
θ ∈ {θ,θ} is a shock observed only by the winner after the object has been assigned. We
assume that 0 < θ < θ and the prior probability of θ is α ∈ (0,1).
The timing of the game is as follows. First each player observes his private signal xi and
submits a bid bi. Then, the auctioneer reveals the bids vector b = (b1,b2), and the object
is assigned and delivered to the highest bidder. Second, after observing θ he may go to the
resale market. This could happens because he observed θ or because he suﬀered a liquidity
shock. The liquidity shock is independent of x = (x1,x2) and θ. Therefore, at the moment
of the resale the buyer is not able to distinguish whether the winner is selling the object
because he observed a low value of θ or because he suﬀered a liquidity shock.
In the case of resale, a bargaining process is assumed between the bidders.1 In order
to analyze the adverse selection problem we focus on a separating equilibrium, in which
the winner does not sell the object if he observes θ and no liquidity shock aﬀects him. We
model the outcome of the resale process as a fraction of the value conditional on all public





. Where z =
(z1,z2) are the inferred signals from the bids in the ﬁrst stage auction; Eπ[θ] = πθ+(1−π)θ
is the expected value of θ conditional on the event that the winner is selling the object;
and ξ ∈ [0,1] is the bargaining power of the seller. In this sense the probability of θ is
denoted by π in the case of resale. It is easy to see, using Bayes’ rule, that in a separating
equilibrium π is equal to
αλ
1 − α + αλ
When player i becomes the winner bidder, his object’s valuation before the resale, is
given by:
1For the sake of simplicity, we assume that in the resale market only participate the original bidders.




On the other hand, if player i is the loser at the auction then, at the moment of the
resale, he only has access to public information and his own signal, therefore, his object’s
valuation is:




Since θ < Eπ[θ] < θ, for all x, wi(xi,xj,θ) < lj(xj,xi) < wi(xi,xj,θ).
The following lemma states a necessary condition over ξ, the seller’s bargaining power,
for the existence of a separating equilibrium in the asymmetric information resale problem.
Lemma 1. There is a separating equilibrium for every x only if:
θ
Eπ[θ]
≤ ξ ≤ 1
Proof. See appendix.
In a separating equilibrium the ﬁrst stage expected valuation for bidder i is
ui(xi,z) =
(
Wi(xi,z) if bidder i wins
Li(xi,z) if bidder i lose
(1)
where Wi(xi,z) = α(1−λ)wi(xi,zj,θ)+(1−α+αλ)p(z) represent the expected bidders
object valuation when he wins. With probability α(1 − λ) the winner will not receive a
liquidity shock and will observe θ retaining the object and obtaining wi(xi,zj,θ). With
probability (1 − α + αλ) he will resale the object in the second stage receiving p(z).
On the other hand Li(xi,z) = (1 − α + λα)[li(xi,zj) − p(z)] represent the expected
bidder’s object valuation when he loses. With probability (1 − α + λα) he buys the object
in the resale market and receives li(xi,zj) − p(z).
3 Equilibrium
In this section we attempt to identify symmetric strictly increasing equilibrium bid functions
for ﬁrst and second price auctions with resale. The following assumptions establish suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of such functions.
Assumption 1. The density function f(·) satisﬁes: f(x)2 − f0(x)[F(x) − 1/2] ≥ 0 ∀x ∈
(0,1).
4Assumption 1 is required to assure that the bid functions are strictly increasing. This
assumption is not very demanding; for example, it holds for many commonly used distri-
butions such as: uniform, exponential and any symmetric single peaked density function.
Assumption 2. The probability of resale in the secondary market is strictly lower than
1/2, i.e. 1 − α + αλ < 1/2.
Assumption 2 is required to assure that the candidate bid functions indeed constitute a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.2 In this model, this requirement is equivalent to imposing that
the marginal beneﬁt of winning the auction is greater than the marginal beneﬁt of waiting





In what follow we develop the second and ﬁrst price auctions cases. We ﬁnd explicit
expressions for the equilibrium bid functions, and we also prove that revenue equivalence
holds. In order to provide some intuition for the results, we consider, as benchmark models,
the cases of ﬁrst and second price sealed bid auctions in the same setting but without resale
opportunities and liquidity shocks.
3.1 Second Price Auction










This expected payoﬀ is composed by two terms: the ﬁrst one consists of the expected
payoﬀ of winning the auction, and the second term is the expected payoﬀ of losing the
auction. In the standard case without resale the second term is zero; however, with resale
opportunities there is some probability of getting the object on the resale market.
The equilibrium strategy is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The equilibrium bid in the second
price auction is given by:
βII(xi) = µ + ζxi + κ(xi) (3)
where
µ = α(1 − λ)θ + (1 − α + αλ)(2ξ − 1)Eπ[θ]
ζ = α(1 − λ) + (1 − α + αλ)ξ
2This assumption is a suﬃcient condition to meet the single crossing property in Athey (2001).
5and







To provide some intuition let us consider the case where the winner bidder has all the
bargaining power in the second stage, i.e. ξ = 1. In this case µ = Eα[θ], and ζ = 1.
Considering that the symmetric equilibrium strategies in the benchmark case are given by
γII(xi) ≡ Eα[θ] + xi, then we have:







The diﬀerence in the bids arises due to the strategic eﬀect of the bids over the resale
price. Note that for a signal below the median of the distribution, the bidder faces a greater
probability of losing the auction, so the strategic eﬀect leads him to bid lower than in the
case without resale. To the contrary, for a signal above the median the opposite eﬀect
occurs.
Finally, when ξ < 1, in addition to the strategic eﬀect, we have to correct the other
terms in the bid function because of the asymmetric information problem. The modiﬁed
terms satisfy µ ≤ Eα[θ] and ζ ≤ 1. When the winner does not have all the bargaining
power, i.e. ξ < 1, the strategic eﬀect is less important, and the two ﬁrst terms are lower
than in the case with ξ = 1.3
3.2 First Price Auction










The equilibrium strategy is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Asumptions 1 and 2 hold. The equilibrium bid in the ﬁrst
price auction is then given by:
βI(xi) = µ + ζE[x|xi > x] + E[κ(x)|xi > x] (6)
Proof. See appendix.
3When ξ < 1 the expression β
II(xi) − γ
II(xi) could be either negative or positive.
6As before, it is convenient to compare this result with the corresponding benchmark
model, where the equilibrium bid functions are given by γI(xi) ≡ Eα[θ] + E[x|xi > x].
Hence, depending on the value of E[κ(x)|xi > x] the equilibrium bids in the presence of
resale opportunities will be lower or higher than in the model without resale. Integrating
by parts we obtain:




(F(xi) − 1/2) − E[x|xi > x]

. (7)
It follows from equation 7 that E[κ(x)|xi > x] < 0 for all xi lower than the median
of the distribution. However, it can take positive values for suﬃciently high values of xi.
The following corollary establishes suﬃcient conditions under which E[κ(x)|xi > x] is non-
positive for all xi, implying that the equilibrium bid in the ﬁrst price auction is always lower
with resale opportunities.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and E[x] ≥ 1/2.
1. If E[x] > 1/2 then βI(xi) < γI(xi) ∀ xi ∈ [0,1].
2. If E[x] = 1/2 then βI(xi) < γI(xi) ∀ xi ∈ [0,1) and βI(1) = γI(1).
Proof. See appendix.
Note that in a ﬁrst price auction over-bidding is costly for both the winner and the
loser. On the one hand, the winner has to pay higher in the ﬁrst stage when he submits a
higher bid; on the other hand, the loser increases the price he will pay in the second stage.
Accordingly, the strategic eﬀect is non-positive, and the bids are always lower than in the
benchmark case without resale.
3.3 Revenue Equivalence
Despite the fact that equilibrium strategies are quite diﬀerent than in the benchmark mod-
els, revenue equivalence still holds.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the expected revenue in a
ﬁrst price auction is the same as in a second price auction.
Proof. See appendix.
The reason why revenue equivalence holds in this setting is because the existence of a
secondary market only aﬀects the structure of the valuations, but not the informational
structure. In fact, the equilibrium would be the same in a private value model with inde-
pendent signals, where bidders’ valuations are given by v(xi) = µ + ζxi + κ(xi).
7Proposition 3 permit us to focus on only one of the auction mechanism to discuss
the seller’s revenue. For example, consider the second price auction, which involves four
equally likely cases, depending on whether the two bidders receive signals above or below
the median. Only when both receive signals above the median, the price in the second
price auction with resale could be higher than in the benchmark case without resale. The
following corollary states suﬃcient conditions for having an unambiguous eﬀect of resale
over expected revenue.
Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold; and E[x] ≥ 1/2, then the expected
revenue in the auction with resale is always lower than the expected revenue in the corre-
sponding benchmark auction.
The previous corollary trivially follows from Corollary 1 and Proposition 3.
4 Conclusion
In this article we have analyzed the role of liquidity shocks and resale opportunities on
the outcome of both ﬁrst and second price auctions, in the presence of adverse selection
problems. In relation to a benchmark -without those eﬀects- we found that equilibrium
bids in the second price auction are more dispersed, while in the ﬁrst price auction they are
lower. In addition, we proved that revenue equivalence still holds and expected revenue is
lower.
Relative to policy implications, diﬀerently from Haile (2002), to postpone the auction is
no longer useful, because no information is revealed until the object is assigned. In contrast,
two other issues arise regarding auction design. First, the signaling eﬀect implies that bids
disclose policy matters. For example, it could be convenient for the seller to reveal only the
winner’s bid in order to avoid a strategic underbidding eﬀect by a potential loser. Second,
not only auction design matters, but also the design of the object being auctioned. For
example, in spectrum auctions a license can be considered as a bundle of rights, which is
usually designed to prevent or reduce resale possibilities. Interestingly, reducing the rights
could increase seller revenues.
5 Appendix





Which are only satisﬁed for every x only if
θ
Eπ[θ]
≤ ξ ≤ 1.










Diﬀerentiating with respect to zi and replacing the equilibrium condition zi = xi we
ﬁnd the unique candidate equilibrium strategy
βII(xi) = µ + ζxi + κ(xi). (9)
First, we must verify that βII(xi) is strictly increasing. ζ > 0 implies that it is suﬃcient
to show that κ(xi) is nondecreasing. Diﬀerentiating κ(xi) with respect to xi we ﬁnd that










Second, we need to show that the ﬁrst-order condition indeed characterizes the optimum.
For this it is suﬃcient to show that
∂UII
i (xi,zi)






























[α(1 − λ) − (1 − α + αλ)].
9Hence, by Assumption 2 the ﬁrst order condition indeed characterizes the equilibrium.










Diﬀerentiating with respect to zi and using the equilibrium condition zi = xi, we ﬁnd
that the unique candidate equilibrium strategy must satisfy:
dβ(xi)F(xi)
dxi







with boundary condition βI(0) = V (0), where Vi(xi) = Wi(xi,xi,xi) − Li(xi,xi,xi). It
follows that the equilibrium strategy is
βI(xi) = µ + ζE[x|xi > x] + E[κ(x)|xi > x]. (12)
First, we must verify that βI(xi) is an increasing function. Comparing equations (9)
and (12) it follows immediately that βI(xi) = E[βII(x)|xi > x]. Hence, βI(xi) is increasing
because βII(xi) is increasing too. Second, we must show that the ﬁrst-order condition
































[α(1 − λ) − (1 − α + αλ)].
Hence, by Assumption 2 the ﬁrst order condition indeed characterizes the equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1. The inequalities µ ≤ Eα[θ] and ζ ≤ 1 imply that it is suﬃcient to

















dt ≤ 0 for all







dt is a monotone increasing; therefore,














dt ≤ 0 for all
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